This paper argues that the fluidity that permeates the contemporary international community is driven by especially political and economic globalisation, which has a huge impact of the relationship between the nation and the state. As the individual nation state is increasingly depending on the international community for its economic survival this dependency on the global has as a consequence that it rolls back aspects of national sovereignty thus opening up the national hinterland for further international influences.
Introduction
When discussing the Chinese diaspora in especially a Southeast Asian context its coherent nature is often at the core of the discourse. According to several authors the Chinese diaspora is characterised by an enduring sense of transnational group identification and global linkages, which makes it well suited as an international channel for Chinese sojourners and migrants. The essence of these arrangements, generally based on narratives that pay tribute to the uniqueness of Chinese culture, is the so-called Guanxi networks, which characterises the different manifestations of this particular diaspora. It refers basically to national as well as transnational relationships revolving around language, ethnic, and kinship affiliations within and between Chinese communities thus giving them a comparative advantage over other networks because of their perceived common Confucian strength of mind. This is especially so when conducting intra-ethnic Chinese business in China and Southeast Asia, as these Guanxi networks have, according to proponents of this business approach, a capability of lowering transaction costs in these types of emerging markets where legal systems generally are underdeveloped. This paper questions the coherence ascribed to the Chinese diaspora in a Southeast Asian context, and to the coherence of diasporic networks in general, arguing instead that a diaspora constitutes a decentred, multilevelled and fractious, generally ethnically affiliated, ideational network that allows people to move in and out of a given diaspora depending on their current social, economic and political situation. The adherence to a perceived affiliated diaspora thus depends on relative social, economic, and political contextual givens. An understanding of diaspora does therefore not depend on systemic network approaches, that is, theoretical constructs hovering above empirical and geographical constrains, but rather by analysing de facto socio-political contexts that delineate a given diaspora. Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-16 By taking such an approach it is imperative to describe the actual social, political, and economic forces which have the capability of initiating changes in the overall societal embedment of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. This is done by analysing the interaction between the latter, his or her community of residence together with the individual Southeast Asian state's attitude towards the ethnic Chinese generally conceived of as a minority group within the national hinterland.
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As the state does not exist in a vacuum but constitutes an integrated part of an international community then this relationship and the dynamics within it also has to be accounted for, as it colours the state's understanding of, in this particular case, the ethnic Chinese minority and its specific social, political, and perhaps more importantly, economic relationships, with its particular nation state of residence.
Basically, this paper argues that the fluidity that permeates the contemporary international community is driven by especially political and economic globalisation, which has a huge impact of the relationship between the nation and the state. As the individual nation state is increasingly depending on the international community for its economic survival this dependency on the global has as a consequence that it rolls back aspects of national sovereignty thus gradually opening up the national hinterland for further international influences. These developments initiate a process of disaggregating state and nation, meaning that a gradual disarticulation of the relationship between state and nation produces new societal spaces, which are contested by non-statist interest groups and transnational more or less deterritorialised ethnic affiliated groups and networks. The argument forwarded in this article is that the ethnic Chinese utilises these newly created spaces for setting up diasporic like networks thus providing substance for transnational ethnoscapes or nations without states, as these spaces are labelled by some authors. Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-16 Such a reading of current affairs in an ever more globalising world leads towards a view that it is omnipotent and simultaneously local cum global in scope. The contemporary world can thus be characterised as displaying a high degree of time-space compression that allows us to immediately acknowledge different types of events regardless of where on earth they take place. It is this conception of immediacy that governs this author's perception of the essence of contemporary globalisation. This view will be employed during the following discussion of the relationship between a budding disaggregating of nation and state, changing perceptions of citizenship, and transnational migration framed in more or less diasporic networks. In relation to the latter an emphasis will put on the ethnic Chinese in especially Indonesia.

On The Changing Mode of the Contemporary Nation State
Just as perceptions of the extent of the world have changed down through history so have the conceptions and constitution of the (nation) state.
Arguably, one has to distinguish between the main raison d'être for pre-and modern types of states. Whereas pre-modern states were mostly concerned with controlling trade routes and making political alliances with more or less collaborative cultures in a fluid and difficult to control surrounding political landscape, modern states, linking their legitimacy to managing a carefully carved out geographically area, are obsessed with policing national borders, maintaining state sovereignty, self-determination, and non-interference in an international community generally thought of as consisting of predatory fellow states.
The origin of the modern state is generally attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia on 24 October 1648 but it was only after the commencement of the industrial revolution in the beginning of the 18 th Century Europe that the state evolved into its present form, that is, towards a state with a closely defined national territory. Historically speaking, the notion and construction of The 'classical' conception of the contemporary nation state can in particular be allotted to the period after World War II, which entails, according to the realist school in international relation theory, a perception of the state as being an almost absolutist and total sovereign entity (see Krasner 1999) .
What is meant by that? Robert Jackson writes that the sovereignty that such a state ascribes to is to be perceived as a legal, absolute, and unitary condition.
It is legal in that a sovereign state is not subordinate to another sovereign but is necessarily equal to it by international law -although not necessarily by international fact. It is absolute in that sovereignty is either present or absent.
When a country is sovereign it is independent categorically: there is no intermediate condition. It is unitary in that a sovereign state is a supreme authority within its own jurisdiction. This is the case whether or not a state has a unitary or a federal constitution, because in either case it is a sole authority in its external relations with other states (Jackson 1990: 32 ius sanguinis: citizenship is based on ethnicity or an ideologically constructed folk model which operates on the notion of descent from a national from within the country concerned when electability for citizenship is determined.
ius soli: citizenship is based on multiple ethnic groups where birth in the territory of the country in question is more important than descent from citizens within a national legitimate ethnic group.
ius domicile: this is a rather new way of gaining entitlement to citizenship as it is possible to achieve through mere residence in the national territory. It has also been referred to as a law of residence by some analysts.
According to the authors the colonial powers usually introduced the nationality rules that existed for their own subjects in their colonies. This meant that throughout the British and American empires ius soli became law, while in French and Dutch possessions a combination between ius soli and a modified ius sanguinis was typically established (Castles and Davidson 2000: 190) .
All three main types of achieving citizenship refer to different categories of societies even though they are all based on the above defined classical notion of the nation state. Citizenship defined along ius sanguinis lines makes it extremely difficult for non-nationals to achieve citizenship if they do not have a relative in the pertinent nation. And in case they do but these relatives are not born in the nation then it is still difficult to achieve citizenship. In this case it is completely up to the discretion of the individual state to grant a non-native beginning of this paper, today there is only one perception of the world even though it might be sub-divided or structured in many different ways. This is contrary to previous perceptions in which several conceptions of the world competed with each other for constituting the true one; perceptions which now must be considered archaic and if applied today an anachronism.
Paradoxically, these international political initiatives, reinforced by economic globalisation, also empowered various ethnic groups within the national hinterlands thereby enabling them to mount pressure on the state to grant them recognition, from political autonomy to cultural respect. For example, a budding supranational morality framed in universal human rights agendas has created space for ethnic groups to promote issues on an international level, which again have the capability of initiating qualitatively shifts in the conditions of people's lives at the local level (Holm and Sørensen 1995: 5, Castles and Davidson 2000: 204) . 1 The same is true for a wide range of NGOs.
Rephrased, it is possible to argue that various aspect of globalisation are leading towards an assertive resurgence of local identities thereby producing an increasing social and political awareness within ethnic groups thus making them influential players in the national political power game.
Furthermore, globalisation is encouraging this development by supporting the emergence of a budding supranational moral construct based on an adherence to a universal human rights regime together with the implementation of notions of good governance and transparent democracy.
Admittedly, this seems highly hypothetical when current international affairs, governed as they are by predatory neo-liberal strategies and total American political, economic and military hegemony, dictate a partial return to earlier anarchic periods in the international community. How the international community will deal with this negative development is still to be seen. Perhaps the solution to this problem is not to be sought in the political realm but rather Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-16 in the economic imperatives that the global economy is enforcing on the individual nation states.
Put together, the dual effects of globalisation, that is, international intervention and local empowerment within the national sphere, constitute the beginning and end in an interrelated movement. This is what Friedman (1998: 6) has coined the packing in of global events, products and frameworks into the local, not so as to de-localise the local, but rather change its content, not least in terms of identity. An interesting consequence of the connection between local identities and international normative patterns of behaviour is that they tend to reinforce each other. As we have seen it several times in Indonesia, the state cannot legitimately force ethnic groups into submission by referring the matter to a question of national security without immediately having the international community on its back. The reason is that having an by various sub-national groups, which utilises them for transnational networking thus providing substance to what Ohmae (1995) and Guibernau (1996) tentatively has defined nations without states. Before I turn towards those kinds of 'in between' spaces or new frameworks for processes of nonstatist regionalisation it is important to address the question of the composition of the state cum nation in a global era.
Towards a Disaggregation of Nation and State?
Taking the volatile developments within the international community into account one is almost forced to ask whether the classical form of the state has reached its climax, historically speaking? For David Jacobson (1998) new transnational, international and regional entities, from international human rights institutions to the European Union are all constraining the state in some respects, and enhancing its role in others. He continues that today we are witnessing a gradual disaggregation of the nation state. The political, communal, and territorial components of the nation state, once thought to be deeply entangled, are gradually being unbundled. Territory no longer constitutes identity in that a territory and a people are no longer viewed as being inextricably linked. Diasporas and transnational identities are increasingly common. Jacobson stresses, however, that the state is not in a decline; on the contrary, its bureaucratic role is enhanced. It is the marriage between state and nation that is in question (Jacobson 1998: 444) .
In order to assess this statement a point of departure can be taken in one of the defining characteristics of the classical concept of the nation state, namely citizenship. As discussed previously this was and still is mainly coined in terms of either ius sanguinis or ius soli. Despite the difference between the two concepts in obtaining citizenship they both refer to individuals who belong to a coherent entity made up of a functional relationship between state and nation.
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One of the main characteristics of the present era besides those described above is a high degree of labour mobility and migration of various kinds. These movements are closely related to economic globalisation that enforces a complex region wide distribution of production modes and sites according to where it is most profitable. This encourages to even higher levels of transnational labour migration as labour conditions wax and wane according to changing economic tides globally as well as within the individual nation state. This mobility of people between nations and regions exert a major pressure on the concept of citizenship to cope with the flow of noncitizens in and out of the respective national borders.
Most of these migrants do not stand a change of becoming citizens in their current country of residence, as they do not live up the pre-set definitions of either ius sanguinis or ius soli. Instead they are generally being categorised as either denizens (foreigners with permanent residence) or margizens (contract workers or undocumented workers). As such they are maginalised by their community of residence in terms of political influence and access to economic and social benefits.
According to the discussion on the relationship between the international community and the nation state the notion of promoting singular nationalities in a globalising world does not make sense in contemporary processes of regionalisation. This fact, however, does not seem to seep into the diplomatic discourse on statist initiated regional cooperation. against the changing tides within the international community of which they are an unbreakable part (Ong 1999) .
The contradiction between political rhetoric as forwarded by the diplomats concerning the importance of upholding national coherence in relation to statist initiated regionalisation programmes and actual political and economic societal transformations within, for example, Southeast Asia are gradually becoming increasingly exposed. This is because statist induced regionalism in the form of politically, economical, and military cooperation clashes with a deepening transnational fluidity of the social, cultural and political landscape across the region thus exhibiting a progressing disaggregation between the individual state and its respective national hinterland.
Reassessing the Ethnic Chinese Diaspora Against The Backdrop Of Entrenching Processes Of Globalisation
The all important point of intersection in this discourse is the relationship between the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation, as the two refer to different societal processes. Regionalism refers to the operation of formal institutions (e.g. APEC and ASEAN); that is, state-led processes concerned with re-organising regional space along certain national political lines. In contrast, regionalisation refers to a bottom-up process of regional integration, for example, ASEAN+3, involving not only broad-based state and Guanxi networks are thus not essential for doing business between ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, as argued by Luo (2000) and Yang (1994) , Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) , and Kotkin (1992) , thereby questioning the coherent nature of these networks. Arguably, Guanxi business networks are thus but one strategy among other business strategies employed, when engaging ethnic-and non-ethnic Chinese business enterprises in creating new national and international spaces of transactions thus confirming Riggs' notion of diasporasation and de-diasporasation. Furthermore, this hypothesis reflects Dirlik's (1996) proposition that Guanxi business practices is an ethnicisation of capitalist practice, not a specific Chinese economy paralleling global capitalism.
The all-encompassing and coherent nature generally attributed to
Guanxi networks is also prevalent in discourses on the Chinese diaspora, coherence is also prominent in the more theoretical literature on diaspora (Brah 1996 , Safran 1999 , Clifford 1994 3 On the contrary, profit motives combined with a pragmatic reading of a given societal landscape in which to operate seem to prevail when doing business -be it with intra-or inter-ethnic partners.
Echoing the above argument that ethnic Chinese networks and diaspora are not necessarily coherent constructs Ien Ang (2001) furthermore sounds a warning note saying that one has to recognise the doubleedgedness of diasporic identity, the latter being the main signifier of the concept that might otherwise not refer to anything else! She writes:
Thus, while the transnationalism of diasporas is often taken as an implicit point of critique of the territorial boundedness and the internally homogenising perspective of the nation state, the limits of diaspora lie precisely in its own assumed boundedness, its inevitable tendency to stress its internal coherence and unity, logically set apart from 'others'. Ultimately, diaspora is a concept of sameness-in-dispersal, not of togetherness-indifference (Ang 2001: 12-13) .
Playing on the definition of diaspora as literally meaning 'the scattering of seeds' Ang thus defines diasporic networks as producing subjects for whom notions of identity and belonging are unsettled. According to her, to an image of living-apart-together. Basically, multiculturalism is nothing more but a more complex form of nationalism, aimed at securing national boundaries in an increasingly borderless world (Ang 2001: 14, 16) In writing about multiculturalism she notes that identity politics is a logical offshoot of the decline of assimilationism and its illusory promise of equality of the basis of a strived-for but never achieved sameness. The politics of identity relies quintessentially on the recognition and mobilisation of differences once the ideal of sameness has proved unreachably. Claiming one's difference from the mainstream of dominant national culture and turning it into symbolic capital has become a powerful and attractive strategy among those who have never quite belonged, or have been made to feel that they do not quite belong in the West or any other places for that matter. The preferred name for that symbolic capital is 'diaspora' (Ang 2001: 11-12) .
A Case Study: The Indonesian Ethnic Chinese
Having said that a diaspora is a decentred ideational construct based As it is generally local social and political circumstances, which in this particular case also include national policies on especially citizenship and national ideologies concerning multicultural coexistence as they resonate down through the various societal levels, that motivates an individual to link up to a pertinent diaspora, let us then look at how the ethnic Chinese perceive themselves and how the community of residence perceives them. Wang Gungwu (1996) employs the concept of sojourning thus employing a historical perspective in his description of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. According to him a sojourner is a temporary resident who is at his new place of residence 'for the time being', that is, for a non-specified period of time. After that he returns to his original home, perhaps to repeat the trip at a later date.
Gungwu notes that this concept fades into the concept of migration but that
there is a time difference between the two concepts. Sojourning has been pervasive in Asia for centuries and implies that the sojourner settled down in the host community in case conditions for doing so were favourable. It was thus not only work that constituted the main driving force behind becoming a sojourner as the term migrant seems to implies (Gungwu 1996: 1-2) . On the other hand, sojourning is also different from immigration as the basic notion behind the former was the temporality of the trip. Immigration implies a oneway trip with an expressed wish of settling down in a new home country. The best known example of sojourners are those coming from the southern provinces of Mainland China, especially Hakka and Hokkien speaking people who in the latter part of the 18 th Century went to West Borneo and Bangka in today's Indonesia to work in the tin mines and plantations found there. Some of those sojourners, who originally started out on a labour contract ticket stayed on in Indonesia but most went back after their work contract expired (Heidhues 1993: 68-88) . Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 5 In relation to the ethnic Chinese during the period of Dutch East Indies many of them were brought there by Dutch traders. As they were not allowed to own land they were to a great extend confined to cities and towns which resulted in the setup of a complex trade infrastructure, as this was the only avenue available to them for obtaining a livelihood. 6 The ethnic Chinese were thus mainly recruited by the Dutch to serve as middlemen between the colonial authorities and the local population. This colonial policy of non-integration and non-assimilation into the Indonesian society have had grave implications for the ethnic Chinese ever since, as they have frequently been accused by Indonesians for sitting heavily on trade and finance thus making it difficult for Indonesians to move into these areas. For this historical conditioned reason the ethnic Chinese have been made scapegoats whenever social and political crises have eventuated in Indonesia.
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When taking a closer look at the Indonesian ethnic Chinese community two main groups' stands out. The first one is the Peranakan and the other one Totok. Peranakans 7 was formerly known as Ali-Baba. The latter originates from 'Ali', which means pribumi (indigenous people) and 'Baba', which means 'Indonesian born Chinese'. Ali-Baba used their local status to claim a higher status over the Sinkeh, the new Chinese immigrants (Beng 1997: 25-26) . The modern usage of Ali-Baba refers to a joint Indonesian-Chinese business or more specifically to an Indonesian frontman in an enterprise secretly financed by an ethnic Chinese. According to William Skinner (1996:78-79 The main aim of these activities was the reorganisation of the ethnic Chinese as an ethnic group, which were to exist on an equal footing with the other ethnic groups in Indonesia. It was a process of integration not assimilation.
This development brought the Chinese communities into the limelight and questions of political loyalty and national belonging became a hotly debated topic. According to Tan (1997) , of the 2.45 million ethnic Chinese believed to live in Indonesia at that time, about one million could be considered having dual nationality; that is, having citizenship in both China and Indonesia. In order to correct this it was decided to force the ethnic Chinese to make a choice between citizenship in one or the other country.
This resulted in the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality, signed in (Tan 1997: 33-35 Even the most assimilated ethnic Chinese was marked out as all Chinese had a code in their passport that indicated they were of Chinese descent and thus not 'blue-blooded' pribumi Indonesians. What is more problematic, however, is a growing split within the ethnic
Chinese community itself, a split that revolves around the question of identity.
Although not an entirely new problem the question of how to designate Overall, the Chinese in Southeast Asia should not be called 'Overseas
Chinese' as it is a label which is appropriate only for citizens of China living overseas.
He concludes:
As proud citizens of our respective countries, we feel insulted to be called or even referred to as 'Overseas Chinese'. We are overseas in China but not when we are at home in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and so forth (Beng 1997:25-32 
The Ethnic Chinese Diaspora and Contemporary Processes of Globalisation: Some Concluding Remarks
As can be seen the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia is being business. Additional insight into these developments is pending further research.
It is a combination of these different types of pressure on the individual ethnic Chinese that triggers his or her desire to relate to an affiliated diasporic network in order to try his or her luck in another community in case the pressure becomes too much to bear in the place of residence. Processes of social uprooting like these followed by actual moving to another host community, nationally or transnationally, can be characterised as sojourning or perhaps better as attempts to assess whether a new location provides better security and opportunities compared to the current place of residence.
In case the new place of residence turns out to be a viable alternative in terms of a better social, economic, and political societal positioning then the sojourner transforms him-or herself into a settler in the new home community.
In this way the diasporic network has become yet another reference point bigger for other sojourners to relate to in their search for an alternative and perhaps more profitable life.
Arguably, these diasporic movements differ markedly from general notions of labour migration, as they are not channelled through agents or other institutionalised recruitment centres, that they are not characterised by circular migration or other repetitive patterns of migration, and that they carry a high degree of long term settling down in the new home community.
Contrary to migration patterns in general, the movements of the ethnic Chinese within the Chinese diaspora as described above provide substance to the notion that a diaspora constitutes a decentred, multi-levelled and fractious, generally ethnically affiliated, ideational network thereby confirming James Clifford's perception of diaspora as dwelling here assumes solidarity and connection there but that there is not necessarily a single place or a nation. On the contrary, there can be many 'here's' and 'there's' in such networks. It furthermore confirms Fred Riggs' perception of processes of diasporisation and de-diasporisation, as people move in and out of a given Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-16 diaspora depending on their current social and political situation. The adherence to a perceived affiliated diaspora thus depends on a relative social, economic, and political context that might motivate an individual to break up from a known locality once an otherwise pervasive notion of trust in it has been undermined. The notion of diaspora as having a grand narrative based on a home and a destination is thus highly simplistic and can therefore not be supported.
As demonstrated in the first part of this paper the changing format of the nation state and its relationship to the likewise changing international community of which it is a constituent part has opened new windows of opportunities for moving around within the Southeast Asian region. Not only, of course, for ethnic Chinese but for all categories of labours and migrants, professionals as well as for spontaneous movements. This is not to say that we are only talking about voluntary movements in the form of labour migration, sojourning or immigration. As mentioned above, the situation on a given locality can change fast and dramatically as we saw it in the wake of the forwarded in this paper is that the ethnic Chinese utilises these relatively newly created spaces for setting up diasporic like networks thus providing substance for the establishment of transnational ethnoscapes or nations without states as they are labelled by some authors. As discussed, these networks do not have a life of their own but constitute latent possibilities which become activated when given social and political developments question the general security in the community of residence. These networks thus wax and vain according to social and political developments within the affiliated home communities. As such they facilitate movements of individuals within a given region that is circumscribed by a decentred and fragmented diasporic narrative thus providing them with an alternative way of pursuing the good life.
It is developments like these that provide substance to processes of subnational regionalisation driven by a host of localised transnational social and Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-16 political forces thus producing a more broad based integration of the region compared to statist initiated formal processes of regionalism.
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